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Introduction 
In an increasingly dynamic and networked knowledge society the nature and boundaries of 
organizations are extended (Castells, 1996; Gulati, Puranam, and Tushman, 2012; Powell, 
Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996). Increasing knowledge intensity, complexity, pace of change, 
technological advances, changes in resource availability, and globalization challenge existing 
organizational arrangements and in response new organizational forms emerge (Daft and 
Lewin, 1993; Fjeldstad et al., 2012; Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003; von Hippel and von 
Krogh, 2003), as new conditions require new strategies and new organizational forms 
(Chandler, 1962; Child, 2005).  
Collaborative forms are particularly prominent (Cross et al., 2010; Hansen, 2009; Heckscher 
and Adler, 2006; Lavie and Drori, 2012). Such forms are increasing both in number and 
impact across diverse and important fields such as biotechnology, professional services, 
information and communication technology, financial services, health care, and military 
operations (Applegate, 2006; Benkler, 2002; Fjeldstad et al., 2012; Maccoby, 2006; Powell et 
al., 2005). Recently, collaborative communities have attracted scholarly attention in the 
emerging literature on collaborative organizational forms (Adler, 2001; Heckscher and Adler, 
2006; Snow et al., 2011). Such designs enable large groups of collaborating actors to self-
organize, implying that they accomplish control and coordination primarily via direct 
interaction among themselves (Benkler, 2002; Fjeldstad et al., 2012). With characteristics 
such as actor autonomy, self-assignment to tasks, sharing of resources in commons, and peer-
based control the new collaborative community designs appear to be governed significantly 
differently than conventional hierarchical designs (Lee and Cole, 2003; O'Mahony, 2007; 
Ostrom and Hess, 2006; Puranam, Alexy, and Reitzig, 2014). The extant literature highlights 
some important governance challenges and mechanism in such forms, but our understanding 
of this topic is still quite limited (Sitkin, Cardinal, and Bijlsma-Frankema, 2010). This study 
explores how collaborative communities are governed. 
This dissertation is structured as follows: First, in this chapter I review the literature on 
collaborative communities, identify common governance challenges and mechanisms, and 
motivate the research questions. In the appendix to this introductory chapter I define and 
briefly discuss some key concepts. In the second chapter, I describe the methods of this 
project in terms of research design, case selection, data collection, and analysis. Then I 
present the three research papers that constitute the core of this dissertation. Finally, in the 
conclusion chapter I summarize the findings, synthesize and discuss implications for research 
and practice, and conclude. 
The rise of communities and collaborative organizational forms 
Contemporary organizations are facing major environmental changes creating both challenges 
and opportunities. The rise of the knowledge society and advances in information and 
communication technologies are among the most influential contextual forces (Castells, 1996; 
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Child and McGrath, 2001; Zammuto et al., 2007), and in the following I briefly discuss their 
impact on organizations.  
Wide diffusion of higher education and academic knowledge across both the developed and 
the developing world has made knowledge-intensive research, development, production, and 
service provisioning possible to do nearly anywhere in the world and made it close to 
impossible for organizations and countries to monopolize on knowledge (Chesbrough, 2003; 
Schofer and Meyer, 2005). The emergence of knowledge workers challenges traditional 
managerial structures and practices as organizational members become more independent, 
empowered, and capable of making decisions about their work (Blackler, 1995; Drucker, 
1993). Increasing knowledge and information intensity poses important organization design 
challenges that conventional hierarchical designs have problems accommodating (Child and 
McGrath, 2001); such as greater interdependence (Puranam, Raveendran, and Knudsen, 2012; 
Whitman, 1999), disembodiment of performance from asset ownership (Dibiaggio, 2007), 
higher pace of change (D'Aveni and Gunther, 1995; Eisenhardt, 1989), and shift toward 
knowledge-based power (Coff, 1999; Mudambi and Navarra, 2004).  
Over the last decades advanced information and communication technologies (ICT) have 
made powerful tools for communication, information storage, access, and processing widely 
available and affordable (Castells, 1996). The Internet and other telecommunication 
technologies connect individuals and organizations in all parts of the world and enable real-
time communication of text, voice, and multimedia. Digital information in vast volumes can 
be stored, searched, and accessed from an array of connected devices. Powerful computational 
resources and software tools support sophisticated design, modeling, representation, and data 
mining, which enable new forms of complex problem solving. These technological advances 
enable new and enhanced organizational capabilities (Zammuto et al., 2007) such as 
visualizing entire work processes (e.g. Barki and Pinsonneault, 2005), real-time/flexible 
product and service creation (e.g. Majchrzak, Cooper, and Neece, 2004), virtual collaboration 
(e.g. Griffith, Sawyer, and Neale, 2003), mass collaboration (Boudreau and Lakhani, 2013), 
and simulation/synthetic representation (Augen, 2002; Carroll et al., 2006). 
The changing conditions have contributed to the emergence of new collaborative 
organizational forms. The new forms have attracted a large number of organization studies 
yielding a multitude of partly overlapping organizational concepts such as the network 
organization (Miles and Snow, 1986; Powell, 1990), the learning and knowledge-creating 
organization (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Senge, 1990), the I-form (Miles et al., 2009), the 
virtual organization (Handy, 1995; Mowshowitz, 1994), the C-form (Seidel and Stewart, 
2011), the collaborative community (Heckscher and Adler, 2006; Snow et al., 2011), the 
meta-organization (Gulati et al., 2012), and the actor-oriented architecture (Fjeldstad et al., 
2012). All of these studies examine organizational forms conducive to collaboration, problem 
solving, learning, innovation, resource sharing, adaptiveness, and continuous improvement. 
Community forms of organizing are among the most salient new forms (O'Mahony and 
11 
 
Lakhani, 2011) and their emergence is stimulated by the “demand for complex, knowledge-
based and solutions-oriented production in the modern capitalist economy” (Heckscher and 
Adler, 2006: 12). In this dissertation I focus on collaborative communities (Heckscher and 
Adler, 2006). 
Collaborative communities 
The term community is in use in a wide variety of disciplines, such as sociology, psychology, 
biology, anthropology, and organization science (Adler, Kwon, and Heckscher, 2008; Barth, 
1969; McMillan and Chavis, 1986; Suttles, 1972; Tönnies, 1887). In the sociological 
community literature a community has at least two basic characteristics (Etzioni, 2003). The 
first is a network of relationships on an individual and/or organization level. This network of 
relationships is typically more cohesive within a community than outside it. Second, 
commitment to a set of shared values, norms affecting the behavior and identity of members. 
A community has to be able to exert moral suasion and extract a measure of compliance from 
its members (Pearson, 1995: 47). At least four types of communities are discussed in 
sociology (Tropman, Erlich, and Rothman, 2001): 1) geographic communities such as 
neighborhoods, towns, or nations (e.g. Hunter, 1974; Whyte, 1943); 2) cultural communities 
such as ethnic and religious communities (e.g. Barth, 1969); 3) community organizations such 
as informal family or kinship networks and professional associations (e.g. Van Maanen and 
Barley, 1984); and 4) organizations with community characteristics (Adler, 2001; e.g. Lee and 
Cole, 2003; Wenger, 1998). Communities are potentially nested and overlapping. 
Collaborative community forms are a subset of the latter category. 
A collaborative community is an organizational form that enables and enhances networking 
among autonomous and interdependent participants, entailing membership, commitment to 
shared purposes and rules for participation (Heckscher and Adler, 2006; Snow et al., 2011). 
Communities nurture the capabilities of their members, and they provide shared services that 
allow members to collaborate with one another and collectively generate joint productive 
outputs beyond serving each member’s individual interests and needs (Snow et al., 2011: 7). 
Such designs enable large groups of collaborating actors to self-organize, implying that they 
accomplish control and coordination primarily via direct interaction among themselves rather 
than by hierarchical subordination (Fjeldstad et al., 2012). 
The extant literature reveals important additional properties of collaborative community 
designs: Commons are essential in production, sharing, and accumulation of resources 
(Benkler, 2002; Lee and Cole, 2003). Infrastructures provide spaces for collaboration and 
sharing (Ostrom and Hess, 2006; Scacchi, 2002). Shared values create high levels of trust 
which is conducive to collaboration (Heckscher and Adler, 2006). Diversity of participant 
knowledge, skills, and views is favorable to complex problem solving and generation of novel 
opportunities (Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2003; O'Mahony, 2007; Page, 2007). Participants are 
typically motivated by both contributing to a common good and achieving private benefits 
(Lakhani and Wolf, 2005; Lerner and Tirole, 2002; von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003). Finally, 
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the associated organizational design processes have strong emergent properties (Garud, Jain, 
and Tuertscher, 2008; O'Mahony and Ferraro, 2007). 
Open source software (OSS) communities are probably the most common form of 
collaborative community and “commons-based peer production” (Benkler, 2002) and has 
become a major societal and economic force (von Krogh and Spaeth, 2007). The largest OSS 
developer platform hosts over 430,000 projects and 3.7 million developers.1 The computer 
operating system Linux, the web server Apache, and the Firefox web browser are among the 
largest and most well-known OSS projects. OSS communities design and develop software 
collaboratively. The source code is freely available as a public good, and in addition to 
contributing cumulatively to the software, participants and any users are free to make their 
own versions adapted to their own needs (Raymond, 1999). Furthermore, contributors may 
gain intrinsic rewards such as enjoyment and learning and non-monetary extrinsic rewards 
such as peer recognition from their invested efforts (Lakhani and Wolf, 2005; Lerner and 
Tirole, 2002; von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003).  
Governance challenges and mechanisms in communities have received recent attention in the 
emerging literature on OSS communities (de Laat, 2007; O'Mahony and Ferraro, 2007). OSS 
communities have characteristics that may not necessarily be shared with other forms of 
collaborative community; specifically, designing and developing a pure information good 
with a high degree of modularity and open and free access to a common resource (the source 
code) and the finished product (the software application)(Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Varian, 
2000; von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003). This implies that other forms of collaborative 
community may have other governance challenges and mechanisms in addition to or instead 
of the ones known from OSS. 
Community governance problems 
Collaborative community forms display distinct governance challenges and mechanism 
(Baldwin and Clark, 2006; Benkler, 2002; Fjeldstad et al., 2012; Garud et al., 2008; 
O'Mahony, 2003; Ostrom, 2000), that I will discuss in this and the following section. 
Organizational governance refers to the means that organizations deploy to influence 
organization members and other stakeholders to contribute to organizational goals and 
purposes (Foss and Klein, 2013) and the means by which the goals and purposes are 
determined. Most of the literature on organizational governance is based on hierarchical 
schemes (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1975), which is of limited relevance to 
communities. Drawing on a growing body of research on organizational and community 
governance, and in particular from the literatures on OSS and commons (e.g. O'Mahony, 2007; 
Ostrom, 2009), I will in the following discuss the governance problems of resource commons 
(Benkler, 2002; O'Mahony, 2003; Ostrom, 1990), team-based production (Alchian and 
                                                 
1 http://sourceforge.net/about, April 16, 2014 
13 
 
Demsetz, 1972; Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan, 2003), and complex problem solving 
(Nickerson and Zenger, 2004; Simon, 1962). 
Commons 
Commons is a key element of collaborative designs (Benkler, 2002; Fjeldstad et al., 2012) and 
pose unique governance challenges (O'Mahony, 2003; Ostrom, 1990, 2009). Commons, or 
common-pool resources (CPR), are shared resources that are built, managed, and used by a 
community and may consist of physical or of intangible resources, such as knowledge 
(Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom and Hess, 2006). Access to commons can be public (libertarian) or 
limited to a group or community (associational) (Levine, 2006). Ostrom (1990: 29) frames the 
commons problem as “how a group of principals who are in an interdependent situation can 
organize and govern themselves to obtain continuing joint benefits when all face temptations 
to free-ride, shirk, or otherwise act opportunistically.” Facing this collective-action problem 
they need to provide a set of rules, make credible commitments to comply with them, and 
establish and operate mutual monitoring (Ostrom, 1990: 42). Ostrom (1990, 2000) proposes 
design principles for how commons can be governed sustainably by the collective action of 
communities without suffering from “the tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968): 1) clear 
boundary rules; 2) effective assignment of costs proportionate to benefits; 3) users of a 
resource design their own rules; 4) rules are enforced by local users or by actors accountable 
to them; 5) graduated sanctions; and 6) conflict-resolution mechanisms.  
Initial focus was on governance of depletable natural resources. There is, however, increasing 
attention on knowledge commons, which is more directly applicable to most collaborative 
communities (Lee and Cole, 2003; Ostrom and Hess, 2006; Snow et al., 2011). Knowledge 
commons comprise ideas—in terms of knowledge, information, and data—embedded in 
digital or analogue artifacts such as books, databases, and computer files (Hess and Ostrom, 
2003). Examples include the local library, the genomic databases of The Human Genome 
Project (Collins, Morgan, and Patrinos, 2003), Wikipedia, the internet encyclopedia (Garud et 
al., 2008), and the source code of open source software communities (Benkler, 2002; Lee and 
Cole, 2003). Knowledge commons are not depletable, but subject to social dilemmas such as 
free riding and private appropriation of the shared good (O'Mahony, 2003; Ostrom and Hess, 
2006).  
Team production 
The problem of governing multiple actors who cooperatively produce joint outcomes—team 
production— is fundamental to all organizations including communities (Giuri et al., 2010; 
Hamilton et al., 2003; Holmstrom, 1982). Team production is characterized by multiple types 
of resources used in a production process, outcomes that are not a separable sum of outputs 
from each resource, and that all resources do not belong to one actor (Alchian and Demsetz, 
1972). Team work may improve productivity due to complementary capabilities, mutual 
learning, peer pressure, and greater motivation, but can also cause free-riding problems as 
actors may shirk, under-invest or over-appropriate (Baldwin and Clark, 2006; Hamilton et al., 
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2003; Holmstrom, 1982; Kandel and Lazear, 1992). Governance can be framed as a 
monitoring problem; to accurately assess the productivity of each resource and actor. Alchian 
and Demsetz (1972) prescribe hierarchy and a central contractual agent as the optimal 
solution to the team production problem. Yet, communities appear to accomplish control and 
coordination primarily via direct interaction among their members rather than by hierarchical 
subordination (Benkler, 2002; Fjeldstad et al., 2012).  
Complexity 
Organizations across different domains have to deal with growing complexity due to 
increasing knowledge intensity, technological sophistication, interdependence, and dynamism 
(Anderson, 1999; Child and McGrath, 2001; Gulati et al., 2012). Complexity is a function of 
the number of elements to a problem and the degree of interaction between them (Kauffman, 
1993; Simon, 1962). Organizational complexity is often linked to problem solving (Nickerson 
and Zenger, 2004; Simon, 1962) and problem-solving organizations utilize the intensive 
technology to solve unstructured problems (Simon, 1973; Stabell and Fjeldstad, 1998; 
Thompson, 1967). The complexity of a problem to be solved influences the relative efficiency 
of alternative governance structures (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004). The elements of a 
complex problem are interdependent; hence a contributor within a particular knowledge 
domain cannot predictably enhance the value of a solution solely based on her own 
knowledge. Complex problems require extensive knowledge sharing and global search, thus 
amplifying knowledge formation hazards: 1) knowledge appropriation, i.e. the receiving party 
in knowledge sharing may appropriate the value at the expense of the sharing party; and 2) 
strategic knowledge accumulation, i.e. hoarding of knowledge and strategically altering the 
search paths and the heuristics guiding it (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004). The hierarchical 
response to complexity is the successive decomposition of complex problems into problems 
and tasks simple enough for human agents to accomplish and the coupling of the task 
structure with a managerial hierarchy where supervising actors govern the activities and 
resources of subordinate actors across multiple levels (Simon, 1962). The task decomposition 
structure and the corresponding management structure are stable and formal (Sabel, 2006). 
We know less about how communities manage complexity and govern complex problem 
solving. OSS communities utilize extensive modularization (Lerner and Tirole, 2002), which 
is a well-known approach to mitigate complexity (Baldwin and Clark, 2000), but in settings 
with higher levels of uncertainty, change, and interdependence modularization has limitations 
(Brusoni, 2005; Chesbrough and Kusunoki, 2001). 
Community governance mechanisms 
Organizations mitigate governance challenges by way of formal and informal governance 
mechanisms (Foss and Klein, 2013; Sitkin et al., 2010). Research on community governance 
(e.g. see de Laat, 2007; O'Mahony, 2007; von Krogh and von Hippel, 2006 for reviews on 
governance on OSS communities) and in the adjacent fields of network governance (Jones, 
Hesterly, and Borgatti, 1997; Provan and Kenis, 2008) and commons governance (Ostrom, 
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1990, 2009) identify a number of such mechanisms. In the following review I discuss three of 
the main categories of community governance mechanisms found in literature: peer-based 
control (Lee and Cole, 2003), shared rules and norms (Ostrom, 2000), and trust (Adler et al., 
2008). 
Peer-based control 
Peer-based control mechanisms are a defining characteristic of collaborative community 
governance, contrary to the well-known authority-based mechanisms of hierarchies (Benkler, 
2002; Fjeldstad et al., 2012). Transparent task structure, resource commons, and membership 
let participants self-assign to tasks, contribute to and find new uses for shared resources, and 
initiate new collaborative relationships (O'Mahony, 2007; Puranam et al., 2014). Mutual 
monitoring—when participants monitor each other—enables self-regulation and peer-based 
control and reduces information asymmetries (Child and Rodrigues, 2003; Ostrom, 1990; 
Varian, 1990). It simplifies the process of tracing contributions and efforts back to individuals 
(Holmstrom, 1982; Welbourne, Balkin, and Gomez-Mejia, 1995) and are commonly found in 
governance of commons of both natural resources and knowledge (O'Mahony, 2007; Ostrom, 
1990). Peer review is an important form of mutual monitoring where participants review each 
other’s work for the purpose of quality assurance. Peer reviewing is an institutionalized 
practice in e.g. academic research and publishing (Zuckerman & Merton, 1971) and open 
source software (OSS) (Lee & Cole, 2003). Following from such peer-based mechanisms, 
peer recognition becomes an important source of reward, motivation, and social status 
(Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003; Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Raymond, 1999; Stewart, 2005). 
Shared rules and norms 
The importance of shared rules and norms is a common theme in the literatures on 
communities and commons (Benkler, 2002; Heckscher and Adler, 2006; Ostrom, 1990; 
Ostrom and Hess, 2006; Van Maanen and Barley, 1984). Rules are guides to action (Knight, 
1992:67). They can be constitutive and regulatory (Searle, 1969:33), enabling (Hart, 1994:57, 
255) and constraining (Pettit, 1990:2). Rules in terms of protocols for interaction provide 
actors with the guiding principles to self-organize; effectively identify and mobilize 
collaborators and resources; collaborately solve problems; share knowledge and ideas; and 
distribute rewards (Fjeldstad et al., 2012). There is, however, less agreement on 1) what are 
effective rules and norms and 2) how they are formed and enforced.  
On the first issue; rules have to be adapted to the context they are used, i.e. matching the 
biophysical and technological attributes of the resource and the resource system, the nature of 
tasks, users, their relationships, and the cultural and institutional context (Hess and Ostrom, 
2003; Ostrom, 2009; Ostrom and Hess, 2006). As in many social and economic systems there 
is convergence on norms of reciprocity and fairness (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Ostrom, 2000; 
Shah, 2006). Norms of reciprocity are for instance formalized in the GPL (GNU General 
Public License) and similar licensing schemes in OSS (O'Mahony, 2003; Stallman, 1999). 
Given the distributed, emergent, and protean nature of collaborative community designs, the 
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challenge becomes to establish rules that provide some stability and allow for entrepreneurial 
action. While the absence of rules possibly will lead to design fragmentation, too many rules 
can potentially stifle the design (Garud et al., 2008: 365). 
On the second issue of rule formation and enforcement, we see a diversity of patterns and 
schemes in the literature. Some communities are elitist, even bordering to autocratic, and 
some are highly participative and democratic (O'Mahony, 2007). The objective of achieving 
wide participation in community work, legitimacy of and compliance with its rules is 
common for all community designs (Fjeldstad et al., 2012; Markus, 2007; Ostrom, 1990), and 
several studies suggest that user participation in crafting rules and in enforcing them is 
conducive to such (e.g. O'Mahony, 2007; Ostrom, 2000), but the evidence is not conclusive. 
In a study of Linux and Wikipedia, Garud and colleagues (2008) find the communities’ 
product and organization designs to be incomplete and continuously evolving as they are 
elaborated over time. The communities provide an evolving set of governance mechanisms 
that are adapted as needs arise.  
Trust 
Trust is conducive to collaboration (Dodgson, 1993; Jarvenpaa and Leidner, 1999) and 
identified as an important governance mechanism in and a distinguishing mark of 
collaborative communities (Adler, 2001; Heckscher and Adler, 2006). Trust is “the 
willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation 
that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the 
ability to monitor or control that other party” (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, 1995: 712). It 
allows for effective knowledge creation and sharing and reduces the need for more intrusive 
governance mechanisms (Adler et al., 2008; Hsu et al., 2007). Trust in organizations is a 
multi-dimensional and multi-level construct that is viewed both as a governance mechanism 
in its own right (Bradach and Eccles, 1989), as a contextual factor influencing the efficacy of 
other governance mechanisms and itself being influenced by the use of other governance 
mechanisms (Hsu et al., 2007; Kramer, 1999). Shared values and social embeddedness are 
important sources of trust in communities (Heckscher and Adler, 2006). Values are beliefs 
that “guide actions and judgments across specific objects and situations” (Rokeach, 1968:160). 
Shared values and common goals unite diverse participants and make their actions more 
predictable and less prone to opportunism. Embeddedness in cohesive social networks 
enhances trust (Coleman, 1988) in the form of process-based (or experience-based) and 
similarity-based trust (Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Zucker, 1986) as cohesive networks reflect 
past and present interactions and make actors more similar over time. 
Research questions 
In the literature review I have identified and elaborated some of the fundamental governance 
problems of collaborative communities related to building and sustaining resource commons, 
team production, and managing complexity. The commons and team production problems 
highlight the challenge of aligning the interests of diverse actors. All three of the main 
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problems points to the challenges of dealing with the complexities of problems, tasks, actors, 
relationships, and resources in communities.  
The review of some of the main categories of governance mechanisms—in terms of peer-
based control, shared rules and norms, and trust—reveals important structural properties and 
process challenges in the development of governance mechanisms, in particular the formation 
of shared rules. 
In exploring the overarching research question of how collaborative communities are 
governed, I investigate three research questions which form the basis for each of the three 
research papers of this dissertation. In the following, I briefly introduce and motivate the 
research questions. 
Governance of agency problems  
As discussed above, collaborative communities comprise autonomous and often diverse 
members in potentially large numbers. Diversity of knowledge, skills, and views is useful in 
complex problem solving and in generating novel opportunities, but may also lead to 
diverging interests which give rise to governance challenges. Problems of diverging interests 
are commonly framed as agency problems in economics and organization theory, and 
commons and team production are examples of such. Hence, my first research question is: 
RQ1: What are the agency problems in collaborative communities and what 
mechanisms are used to govern them? 
Governance of complex problem solving 
Business and societal problems are becoming increasingly complex and solving them requires 
dynamic mobilization, coordination, and governance of diverse sets of interdependent actors 
and resources across time and space. Collaborative communities are found particularly suited 
for such purposes, but outside the context of OSS and natural resource commons we have 
limited knowledge about how such designs govern and organize complex problem solving. In 
the second paper I explore: 
RQ2: How is complex problem solving governed in collaborative communities?2 
Deliberate design and design processes 
The discussion of the formation and enforcement of rules shows that there are important 
process aspects to governance in communities. The process whereby rules emerge matters as 
well as the nature of the rules themselves. Studies show that organizational design processes 
in communities have strong emergent properties, but overall we know little about community 
design processes. From other organizational forms we know that the process of design is 
important both for the content of design and the ability to implement (Child, 2005; Nadler and 
Tushman, 1997). Design processes can be deliberate and emergent (Dunbar and Starbuck, 
                                                 
2 As is discussed in the methods section, paper two is based on a single-case study in a drug discovery 
context; hence the research question in paper two is specified for that context. 
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2006; Garud, Kurnaraswamy, and Sambamurthy, 2006; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). For 
any purposive organization one can expect its design to be influenced by conscious intention 
and reflection among organizational actors, i.e. some form of deliberate design (Child, 2005), 
but our knowledge of how deliberate action and emergent social processes shape community 
structure and vice versa (i.e. structuration process (Giddens, 1984)) is very limited. In the 
third paper I explore the following research question:  
RQ3: What is the content and process of organization design and the role of deliberate 
design and action in collaborative communities? 
Summary and concluding comments 
In this dissertation I explore different facets of how collaborative communities are governed. 
The first two research questions focus on two major sources of governance issues—agency 
problems and complexity—and the mechanisms used to mitigate these. The first on agency 
problems targets macro-structural properties, while the second on complex problem solving 
directs attention to micro-level structures and processes. The third question focuses on the 
content and process of design and how community structure and participant action mutually 
shape each other over time, thus covering the interplay between structure and process across 
macro and micro levels. Taken together the research questions cover three major analytical 
dimensions in studying community governance: 1) governance issue—problems, mechanisms, 
and behavior/outcomes; 2) structure and process; and 3) level of analysis—macro and micro. 
The research questions form the basis for the three papers that constitute the core of this 
dissertation. The papers review relevant literature, motivate the research questions further, 
outline the methods, present the findings, and discuss implications.  
Appendix to introduction: Some key concepts 
A number of concepts central to this dissertation introduced in this chapter, are used 
throughout the papers. I define some of them here before proceeding. Therefore, the following 
terms are defined and briefly explained below: Collaboration, organizational governance, 
organization, organization design, and hierarchy. The notions of collaborative community and 
community were discussed in the section on “The rise of communities and collaborative 
organizational forms” above. 
Collaboration 
Collaboration is a central concept in recent literature on organizations and interorganizational 
relations (Ahuja, 2000; Hansen, 2009; Martin and Eisenhardt, 2010; Powell et al., 1996; 
Powell et al., 2005; Uzzi and Spiro, 2005). The colloquial meaning is to work jointly together, 
especially in an intellectual endeavor (Merriam-Webster, 2014).3 In this dissertation I follow 
Wood and Gray’s (1991: 146) conceptualization: “Collaboration occurs when a group of 
                                                 
3 Etymology of collaboration: Late Latin ‘collaboratus’, which is past participle of ‘collaborare’, i.e. to 
labor together. From Latin ‘com-‘ + ‘laborare’, i.e. to labor. (Merriam-Webster, 2014) 
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autonomous stakeholders of a problem domain engage in an interactive process, using shared 
rules, norms, and structures, to act or decide on issues related to that domain.” Collaboration 
is a resource-demanding form of coordinated work involving extensive mutual adjustment, 
hence the costs (and alternative costs) of collaboration may outweigh the benefits (Hansen, 
2009). 
Collaborative settings are settings characterized by conditions conducive to collaboration and 
where collaboration frequently takes place. Such settings will typically also involve individual 
work and social exchanges not defined as collaboration, but such work and behavior will not 
violate collaboration principles. 
Organizational governance 
Organizational governance refers to the means that organizations deploy to influence 
organization members and other stakeholders to contribute to organizational goals and 
purposes (Foss and Klein, 2013) and the means by which the goals and purposes are 
determined. Organizational governance includes the notions of organizational control, 
corporate governance, and governance of key external dependencies (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997: 737; Sitkin et al., 2010). Control in organizations is the 
setting of goals, monitoring and enforcement of goal fulfillment, allocation of resources, and 
distribution of rewards (Lebas and Weigenstein, 1986; Perrow, 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). It is typically understood to entail the governance of the human capital within the 
boundaries of the organization (Foss and Klein, 2013) and involves combinations of input, 
behavior, and output controls (Cardinal, 2001; Kirsch, 1996; Ouchi and Maguire, 1975). 
There are links between different corporate governance modes and organizational 
architectures (Aoki and Jackson, 2008). Unless otherwise specified, in this document I use the 
term “governance” as shorthand for organizational governance. 
Organization and organization design 
I draw on March and Simon’s (1993: 2)4 conceptualization of organizations: “Organizations 
are systems of coordinated action among individuals and groups whose preferences, 
information, interests or knowledge differ.” Although other researchers have offered 
variations on this definition (e.g. Aldrich, 1979; Burton and Obel, 1984; Etzioni, 1964; Scott, 
2003), some common characteristics remain (as synthesized by Puranam et al., 2014: 163), 
portraying an organization as 1) a multi-actor system with 2) identifiable boundaries and 3) 
system-level goals (purpose) towards which 4) the constituent actor’s efforts are expected to 
make a contribution. 
Puranam et al. (2014) propose that all organizations have to solve four universal problems: 
task division, task allocation, reward distribution, and information provision. Organization 
design is the principles, structures, processes, and infrastructures employed to solve these 
problems, fulfill organizational purposes and goals, and match environmental conditions 
                                                 
4 In the introduction to the second edition of their seminal book from 1958. 
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(Burton and Obel, 1998; Fjeldstad et al., 2012; Galbraith, 1974; Thompson, 1967). The 
design process can be deliberate and emergent (Dunbar and Starbuck, 2006; Garud et al., 
2006; Kates and Galbraith, 2007; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). 
Hierarchy 
Hierarchies are systems where units are ordered such that lower-level units are parts of, or 
subordinated to, units on the immediate higher level (Simon, 1962). In a strict hierarchy, no 
unit can have more than one immediate superior; this is the “unity of command” concept in 
organization theory (Gulick, 1939; Simon, 1946). Hierarchical organizations employ a set of 
structural principles for organizing tasks, authority, and information flows. A task hierarchy is 
the successive decomposition of tasks into more specialized ones that on the lowest level can 
be performed by an individual or a team (Simon, 1962). Authority hierarchy is where higher-
level units have decision and conflict-resolution authority over lower-level units (March and 
Simon, 1958). Lower-level units may be delegated decision rights over certain domains and 
resources from higher-level units. Information flow and processing can also be hierarchical, 
implying that higher-level units have broader access to information and filter and 
communicate information relevant to specific subordinate units in the form of requirements, 
plans, rules, etc. (Galbraith, 1974; March and Simon, 1958). Subordinate units report 
operational information to superior units. An important design principle is to maximize intra-
unit and minimize inter-unit interdependencies, i.e. to group together tasks that are highly 
interdependent and require extensive coordination (Thompson, 1967). Most major 
organizational forms, such as the functional, multi-divisional, matrix, and multi-firm network 
forms, are based on hierarchical principles (Chandler, 1962; Galbraith, 1971; Miles and Snow, 
1986; Mintzberg, 1983). I do not specifically investigate hierarchy in this study, but rather 
discuss it in contrast to collaborative community forms of organizing. 
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Methods5 
In this study, I explore governance in collaborative communities across multiple dimensions 
including structure and process, micro and macro levels of analysis. This favors research 
approaches utilizing rich structural, processual, longitudinal, and contextual data in order to 
uncover potentially complex patterns and mechanisms (Barley and Tolbert, 1997; George and 
Bennett, 2005; Langley, 1999; Pettigrew, 1987, 1990; Van de Ven and Poole, 2005). I have 
chosen an exploratory multiple-case study design that is appropriate for such purposes 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Graebner, Martin, and Roundy, 2012; Pettigrew, 
1987; Yin, 2009). Multiple-case designs enable comparison that helps determine whether 
findings are particular to a standalone case or consistently replicated over multiple cases (Yin, 
2009). Multiple cases provide a basis of more varied empirical evidence on which more 
robust theories can be built. They make it easier to determine the appropriate level of 
construct abstraction and develop more precise definitions (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; 
Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991). Furthermore, recently calls for more comparative research on 
community organizing have been made (O'Mahony and Lakhani, 2011). A multiple-case 
study design can be combined with single-case studies, and if so, it provides the basis for case 
selection based on the deep understanding of a few cases. The overall design of this project is 
multiple-case, which is also reflected in Papers 1 and 3. Paper 2 is based on a single-case 
study and I will explain the rationale for the specific method choices per paper later in this 
section. 
I have based the research process to a large degree on the process of building theory from case 
study research suggested by Eisenhardt (1989), which is inspired by Glaser and Strauss 
(1967), Yin (1981; 2009/1984), Miles and Huberman (1994/1984), and others. It consists of 
the following phases: 1) review literature and formulate research question; 2) conduct 
mapping of collaborative communities; 3) sharpen research question(s); 4) select cases; 5) 
craft instruments and protocols; 6) collect data on cases; 7) analyze data; 8) shape theory; 9) 
revisit literature and refine theory; and 10) synthesize and conclude. Although there is a 
logical sequence to these phases in the research process, several of them were conducted in 
parallel in an iterative fashion. This was particularly true for data collection, analysis, and 
early theory development, but also to some degree for case selection. Early findings in the 
first case informed the selection of subsequent cases consistent with a grounded theory 
approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). A more detailed discussion of each of the phases follows.  
                                                 
5 This chapter contains the most extensive description of the methods used in the dissertation project. As 
the methods and data are used across the three papers I wanted to reveal more details and discuss choices 
and tradeoffs more thoroughly here than the paper format allows. This implies that there are significant 
redundancies between this chapter and the methods sections of the three research papers. 
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Case selection 
I identified and selected cases according to theoretical sampling principles (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967) following a stepwise process: 1) mapping of collaborative communities; 2) definition of 
case selection criteria; 3) evaluation and shortlisting of prospective cases; and 4) case 
selection.  
Based on an initial literature review and a working definition of collaborative communities, I 
started identifying empirical examples of collaborative communities in order to get an 
overview of the variation of forms across sectors and geographies and build an unfiltered 
longlist of prospective case studies. I have purposefully not sampled open source software 
(OSS) communities, which are one of the most common types of collaborative community. 
These are well-researched forms and I draw on the extant literature in this study (e.g. Benkler, 
2002; Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003; O'Mahony and Ferraro, 2007). I identified and logged 
70 potential collaborative communities by examining academic and practitioner literature, 
searching the Internet, and using personal and professional networks. All three search 
approaches generated leads, although the latter proved the most successful. I initially 
contacted a number of people, via email for the most part, and predominantly colleagues in 
the consulting company Accenture, asking them to identify potential collaborative 
communities and name knowledgeable people on the topic. Based on the responses I received, 
I conducted meetings in person, online, and by phone and snowballed new prospective cases 
and new contacts from each interaction. I contacted in total 114 people, generating 57 
substantive responses with 30 prospective cases and 63 new contacts (included in total). The 
responding contacts were based in 22 cities in 11 countries across three continents (North 
America, Europe, and Asia) and represented a diversity of sectors and backgrounds. I 
conducted seven interviews and a large number of informal meetings and phone calls during 
the mapping phase. 
I developed case selection criteria in two main iterations. Based on the initial literature review 
and intermediary results from the mapping, I developed an initial set of selection criteria upon 
which the first case was selected. On the basis of preliminary findings from the first case and 
a second round of literature review, I sharpened case selection criteria and applied them to the 
selection on the subsequent cases. 
I selected cases based on similarity and variation on the following criteria. First, cases had to 
posit characteristics of collaborative communities as defined above, specifically 1) enabling 
networking, 2) autonomous and interdependent participants, 3) membership, 4) commitment 
to shared purposes, and 5) rules for participation. Second, I sought variation in terms of forms 
of collaboration and performance. Variation in forms of collaboration provided rich empirical 
settings for investigating governance problems. I sought performance variation in the case set 
to make possible the development of causal explanations of how governance and organization 
design influences performance. Third, variation in terms of geography, business sector, and 
performance mitigate cultural, industry and field, and success biases respectively. These are 
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common issues in business and organizational research (Baum, 2007). Finally, it had to be 
possible to study the cases over time—in real time and/or retrospectively—on actor and 
organizational levels in order to enable analysis of structuration processes (Langley, 1999; 
Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991; Stones, 2005). In addition, to ensure observability there had to be 
significant interaction and exchange in the case communities and participation had to involve 
more than a small team of members. 
I evaluated and filtered the long list of prospective cases based on rough criteria after brief 
information gathering and screening of each case. Cases that matched high-level criteria 
underwent more analysis and through a selection process I identified and ranked a shortlist of 
prospective cases. Subsequently I approached an individual in a central organizing role in 
each of the most promising collaborative communities for an initial informational interview. 
This interview served two purposes: 1) data gathering and validation of match with selection 
criteria; and 2) relationship building and gauging interest in participating in the study. 
After an evaluation, shortlisting, and validation process including screening interviews, I 
selected the cases. Four cases are included in this study. The cases are listed in Table 1 (in the 
order in which they were selected), which also indicates how they vary on key characteristics. 
The four cases represent the desired variation on the selection criteria specified above and the 
data collection and analysis process has given me reason to believe that theoretical saturation 
has been reached (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). More detailed descriptions of the cases are given 
in the three research papers. Even though each case went through the specified evaluation 
process, different cases could be at different stages in the research process at any time. Case 
identification and selection activities were ongoing for 1.5–2 years and I selected the first case 
before the three last cases were identified.  
Data collection 
The case studies involved interviews, participant observation, and documents; data collection 
techniques common for case studies (Yin, 2009). Multiple types of data from different sources 
inside and outside the community increase the robustness of results through triangulation 
(Jick, 1979). Multiple data sources are also necessary to cover events and processes in real 
time and retrospectively, unfold inner and outer context, and map actors, relationships, and 
structures (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991). 
Interviews 
Interviews are a primary data source and have the advantage of obtaining multiple 
perspectives on events, processes, relationships, facts, outcomes, opinions, and emotions, as 
people have different roles, experiences, backgrounds, competencies, and interests. 
Furthermore, they enable collecting both real-time and retrospective data (Rubin and Rubin, 
2012). The interview format is semi-structured, i.e. guided by a written interview guide 
ensuring focus on expected key topics and consistency across interviews. This eases 
comparison in the analysis phase (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). It is also a flexible format 
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that allows me to probe topics that are particularly interesting and about which the 
interviewee is particularly knowledgeable (Rubin and Rubin, 2012). There are two forms of 
interview guide targeting two discrete groups: community members/participants and 
community members in organizer roles. 
I used a five-step interview process: 1) selecting interviewees; 2) booking appointment and 
preparing for the interview; 3) conducting and recording the interview; 4) transcription; and 5) 
coding (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). Interviewee selection was critical. I sought diversity of 
facts, experiences, and interests by interviewing a diverse set of people in and around each 
community. Key target groups included organizers; a variety of members or participants in 
terms of roles, backgrounds, seniority, centrality, competencies, etc.; and external 
stakeholders such as investors and observers. I identified and selected interviewees in 
cooperation with the key contact(s) in each case, typically asking them to introduce me to the 
interviewees. I attempted to overcome potential selection biases by asking different people for 
advice on whom to interview. In preparation for each interview I reviewed previous 
interviews, if the person had been mentioned, and searched the web for relevant information, 
such as LinkedIn profiles, to identify what they were knowledgeable about, their roles, 
relationships, etc. This formed a basis for topics and questions to focus on or add in each 
interview. 
I conducted 75 semi-structured interviews with 83 people, 10–36 interviews per case. Fifty-
six of the interviews were done in person and on site, and all were recorded and transcribed. 
Six of the OSDD interviews were group interviews, and six people across the OnCorps, 
LOHAS Asia, and OSDD cases were interviewed multiple times in order to trace 
development over time. Before the start of data collection I planned to conduct 10–25 
interviews per case depending on case complexity and access. The number of interviews for 
the OSDD case goes well beyond this threshold (33 interviews with 54 interviewees). I chose 
to do this for several reasons: 1) the scale of the community; 2) the diversity of its participants; 
3) the complexity of drug discovery; 4) the desire to do a thorough, single-case study of the 
community; and 5) unrestricted access.  
All interviews were recorded and transcribed with the interviewees’ consent. The project data 
management routines complied with Norwegian data privacy rules and were approved by 
Norwegian Social Science Data Services. The recording of each interview was transcribed by 
an external service provider.6 The interview transcripts amount to more than 1500 pages of 
single-spaced text. I listened to every recording, reviewed all transcripts, and made the 
necessary corrections. This time-consuming and robust process has ensured high-quality 
transcripts, upon which subsequent analysis is based. Finally, each interview transcript was 
coded (more on this in a later section on coding). 
                                                 
6 All interviews (65) for the OnCorps, LOHAS Asia, and OSDD cases were conducted in English and 
transcribed by an Indian provider. Most of the interviews (eight) in the DigiFam case were conducted in 
Swedish and transcribed by a Finnish provider, while the remaining two interviews were in Norwegian and 
were transcribed by a Norwegian provider.  
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Research interviews have three general shortcomings (Van Maanen, 1979), which I believe I 
have been able to mitigate to a large degree. First, there is a researcher bias embedded in the 
set of questions being asked. Important topics that the researcher does not ask about often do 
not surface during interviews. I addressed this partly by ending each interview with an open-
ended question probing for other relevant data. 7  Second, consciously or unconsciously, 
interviewees frequently misrepresent data (Van Maanen, 1979). I have handled this issue 
through diverse sets of interviewees and triangulation with other data sources. Third, the 
interview setting is often outside the context being studied, exposing the researcher to the risk 
of misunderstanding or at least not fully understanding the meaning and importance of 
interviewee statements. I interviewed as many people as possible in their own context, i.e., in 
their office, lab, favorite café, etc. Introducing an element of ethnography with participant 
observation into the research design has mitigated some of the potential biases of interviews. 
Documents 
As far as possible, I collected documents on all the cases. Document types include contracts, 
process descriptions, vision and value statements, financial statements, membership lists, 
presentations for internal and external audiences, news reports, academic publications, and 
websites. I collected documents from all phases of the communities’ lifetime, i.e., from 
foundation (or earlier) up to the time of study. The number and richness of documents 
available varied among the cases. In the DigiFam case I had full access to the electronic 
archives. On SysBorg 2.0, OSDD’s online collaboration platform, all data and most of the 
interaction were logged and available. OSDD has also been featured in a large number of 
news reports and discussed in academic articles by authors within and outside the community. 
Observations and field research 
I have included some elements of observation in the study. During six field research trips over 
a total of seven weeks, I conducted the majority of interviews in person and in the context 
where the interviewees work and socialize. In the LOHAS Asia and OSDD cases, online 
collaboration spaces were available to study, where interaction was observed in real time and 
retrospectively. In the OSDD case, I conducted eight days of observation, five days in the 
project director’s office and three days during an annual scientific review meeting with 60 
participants who participated actively with presentations and in discussions. I made extensive 
field notes. The volume and types of data collected per case are summarized in Table 2. 
Data analysis 
There is an interaction between systematic analysis and intuition in making sense of, 
identifying patterns in, and generating insights from rich data in qualitative theory generating 
research (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Systematic analysis in this context has two main 
purposes: uncovering patterns and insights from the empirical data and “testing” intuitively 
                                                 
7 From the interview guide: “Are there other topics you think are relevant that we have not talked about? 
Any questions I should have asked?”  
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induced theoretical insights from any stage of the research process on the empirical material 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Pettigrew, 1987).  
Coding and use of qualitative analysis software 
All data, i.e. interview transcripts, field notes, and case documents, were uploaded in NVivo 
qualitative analysis software for coding and analysis. First-order coding is the systematic 
matching of text and other forms of data to categories of actors, functions, processes, events, 
and other theoretically relevant constructs. I combined inductive, deductive, and iterative 
approaches in generating, applying, and developing the coding system. First, I read some of 
the first interview transcripts and inductively identified categories from the text. Second, I 
synthesized a number of key constructs from a review of about 10 of the main theories 
informing organization design and governance.8 I wrote the categories from both lists on 
Post-it Notes that I stuck to a wall and gradually organized into four broad hierarchies of 
category: structural elements, coordination and control, evolution and dynamics, and 
outcomes. In using the coding system, I adapted and changed it iteratively as new categories 
were added, some consolidated, some moved, etc. I allowed for redundancy in the coding, e.g. 
the same bits of text could be tagged to multiple categories. All codes were listed and defined.  
I conducted a small-scale test of coder reliability. Based on a predefined test protocol, a 
second coder recoded one interview.9 The overall inter-coder reliability was 93%, based on 41 
instances of coding.10 The second coder recommended making no corrective actions after the 
test. 
The use of NVivo qualitative data analysis software supported the analysis process in at least 
two ways. First it has an indexing function, which makes it easier to systematically search and 
analyze large volumes of textual data and avoid the ever-present danger of “death by data 
                                                 
8  Theories reviewed (with example references) include agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976); 
information processing (Galbraith, 1974); transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975); institutional 
theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; North, 1990); commons (Ostrom, 1990); networks (Granovetter, 
1985); resource dependency (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978); relational view/alliances (Dyer and Singh, 1998); 
behavioral view (Cyert and March, 1963; March and Simon, 1958); and contingency theory (Thompson, 
1967). 
9 The second coder was a colleague at BI Norwegian Business School. An interview representative of the 
overall interview set was selected that followed the interview guide and covered multiple topics (1 hour 3 
minutes duration, 29 pages of transcript). In order not to make test overly complex, the second coder was 
instructed to use one of the main branches of the coding system constituting about half of the categories 
(117 of 237 categories). He was introduced to the overall structure of the coding system and given a list of 
the selected part of the coding system with each category defined. I stayed in the room and was available 
for clarifying questions but did not interfere in the process. After the second coder completed coding the 
interview, we compared each instance of coding, and logged each instance with specific line references. 
10 Specifically, 39% (16 instances) of coding were identical, 54% (22) were reconcilable differences, and 
the remaining 7% (3) were disagreements or errors and omissions by the first coder. Of the reconcilable 
differences 24% (10) were missed coding by the second coder, 10% (4) were instances where the first 
coder had applied more codes than the second coder, and the remaining 10% points (4) were definitional 
clarifications. All the reconcilable differences were instances where both coders had the same 
understanding of the content and deemed the first coder’s approach appropriate. The test took about four 
hours (excluding breaks). 
38 
 
asphyxiation” (Pettigrew, 1990: 281). Second, it brings rigor and traceability to sensemaking 
and theorizing from the case material (Sinkovics and Alfoldi, 2012). The study combined 
inductive and deductive logics in analysis and theorizing. Literature studies, data collection, 
coding, analysis, and theorizing were conducted in iterative cycles until theoretical saturation 
were reached, i.e. convergence on categories (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Theory and data 
mutually informed each other and coevolved during the study (Van Maanen, Sørensen, and 
Mitchell, 2007). 
Within-case analysis 
I have written short case summaries for each of the cases and in the case of OSDD I have 
written a comprehensive case narrative describing the chronology of events, structural 
characteristics, actors and relationships, processes, and outcomes. Tools used in within-case 
analyses also include timelines of events and detailed process tables (example of the latter can 
be found in Table 1 on the drug discovery process in Paper 2).  
Cross-case analysis 
The cross-case analysis had two interrelated purposes: 1) to assist in uncovering patterns 
across cases that could be hard to see from a single case; and 2) to apply the theoretical 
constructs and relationships from one case or a subset of cases on the other cases validating 
the replicability of the findings. The latter is known as the replication logic and advocated by 
Yin (2009) and Eisenhardt (1989).  
I used tabulation and visualization techniques (Langley, 1999) in data reduction and synthesis 
to explore and describe the cases and order and explain the findings (Miles and Huberman, 
1994). In exploring and describing the cases I applied a number of techniques to assist in 
pattern recognition and matching. The process of applying multiple techniques and formats to 
the same sets of data has been a way of exploring different ways of organizing the data and 
making sense of them. The differing ease of applying the techniques and the meaningfulness 
of the displays gave strong indications about which patterns were a good fit with the data. The 
techniques for ordering and explaining the data were chosen on the basis of their ability to 
expose and explain the patterns and relationships found in preceding stages.  
Let me give an example of the use of multiple tabulation and visualization formats from the 
development of Paper 1 (on agency problems and governance mechanisms). In the spring of 
2012 I had started data collection on three of the cases, but had only conducted 12 interviews 
(of those reported here). The first draft of the taxonomy of community governance 
mechanisms was a visual representation of a tree structure with tick boxes indicating the 
presence of each mechanism for each of the three cases. I used the tree representation when 
presenting the ideas in the paper and it worked well as a communication devise in oral 
presentations. In the process of writing up the first draft of the paper several months later, I 
also developed a more content-rich tabular representation. In the first couple of drafts of the 
paper I kept both representations, but because of the redundancy between them I decided to 
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merge them into what is now Table 4 in Paper 1. At the same stage I developed the simple 
diagram in Figure 1 in Paper 1 to illustrate the inverse relationship between two governance 
mechanisms, a relationship I discovered at an early stage but until then only had described 
textually. 
Combining multiple and single-case methods 
The overall design of this project is that of an exploratory multiple-case study for the reasons 
explained above. In Papers 1 and 3 I apply the same multiple-case approach and the full data 
set of all four cases. It proved valuable to make use of the variation and comparability of the 
four cases to explore the research questions of both of these papers. Even though the methods 
and data of the two papers are the same, the questions, theoretical lenses, and findings are 
very different. 
For Paper 2 on the governance of complexity, we (i.e. my coauthor Øystein Fjeldstad and I) 
chose to do a single-case study of Open Source Drug Discovery (OSDD). OSDD is an ideal 
context for studying governance of complex problem solving in a collaborative community. 
First, drug discovery represents a highly complex form of problem solving, involving 
identification and validation of biological targets, mapping of structure-activity relationships, 
and identification, validation, and optimization of bioactive chemical compounds that may be 
used in therapeutic drugs (Civjan, 2012; Drews, 2000). It is an important societal sector 
impacting the health and wellbeing of the world’s population and creates significant economic 
value. Second, OSDD represents a novel organizational approach to drug discovery with an 
open and diverse community rather than the secretive and hierarchical approach of 
conventional pharmaceutical companies. Finally, the unrestricted access I had, and extensive 
data collection that I conducted on that particular case, provided empirical data with the depth 
and breadth required to do an extensive, in-depth, single-case study on the topic. 
Limitations and tradeoffs 
Generally field study-based research such as case studies are considered to maximize realism 
at the expense of precision and generalizability (McGrath, 1982). More specifically, five 
common limitations and trade-offs with case studies have been identified (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007; George and Bennett, 2005; Graebner et al., 2012): selection bias; limited 
ability to determine the size of causal effects; the risk of generalizing case-specific 
relationships; researcher and informant biases; and the trade-off between theoretical 
parsimony and explanatory richness. 
In this study I have attempted to overcome such limitations and tradeoffs in several ways. 
First, I have mitigated potential selection biases through the theoretical sampling procedures 
described in the “case selection” section above. Second, I ask “how” and “what” rather than 
“how much” questions; this means that the effect size limitation of the method is not a 
problematic constraint for this study as the purpose is to investigate causal mechanisms and 
processes rather than the size of the effects. Third, the multiple-case studies approach I chose 
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implies comparing similarities and variation across cases. This increases the ability to identify 
boundary conditions and assess the transferability of the findings and the insights derived 
from them to other contexts, hence mitigating generalizability concerns to some degree. 
Fourth, the risk of researcher bias cannot be eliminated completely, but has been significantly 
reduced through the research design and process. A test of coder reliability was conducted 
with satisfactory results and the path from interviews to analysis is fully traceable through 
verbatim transcription of interviews and coding of all textual material in NVivo. The research 
papers have been sent to key informants for each of the cases for quality assurance11 to further 
reduce the probability and degree of any potential researcher bias. I have mitigated informant 
biases by interviewing diverse sets of informants for each of the cases and triangulating with 
other sources of data, such as documents, news reports, and observations (Jick, 1979; Yin, 
2009).  
Finally, the tradeoff between parsimony and richness is to a limited degree determined by the 
research design and to a greater extent done in the analysis, theorizing, and writing stages of 
the research project. Still, there are discussions among case study researchers about “better 
stories” or “better constructs,” debating the virtues of single and multiple-case studies (Dyer 
and Wilkins, 1991; Eisenhardt, 1991). In a project like this, these are not mutually exclusive 
alternatives. A multiple-case approach allows for single-case studies when investigating 
particular research questions and in specific papers, as I have done in Paper 2 in this 
dissertation. The OSDD case displays novel governance issues and mechanisms in the rich 
and challenging context of drug discovery. This has allowed an investigation of mechanisms 
and processes richer in detail than might otherwise have been possible. 
Reflecting on ontological, epistemological, and behavioral assumptions 
My starting point for this study has been to attempt to understand the phenomenon of 
governance in collaborative communities. I did not enter the field with elaborate and 
definitive views on social theory and philosophy of science, rather a desire and need to make 
sense of complex issues and messy empirical data. As I was exploring the empirical data and 
applying different theoretical lenses I had to take their views of the world, knowledge, and 
people into account in my assessment. Reflecting on my observations, it became clear that in 
collaborative communities, social structure is both constraining and enabling action among 
participants and that it contains some strong institutional elements. It also was apparent that 
structure is not fixed, but dynamically shaped over time. I found these patterns to match 
structuration theory very well. This is explicitly expressed and discussed in Paper 3 on 
deliberate design and action, but it is also an implicit perspective reflected in the overall study.  
                                                 
11 Written “research access agreements” with three of the four cases regulate quality assurance by key 
informants and the academic freedom of the researcher: “[Case organization] representative(s) will be 
invited to check facts and give feedback on case study drafts.” “The RESEARCHER will be granted full 
research freedom. Research findings and interpretations are made and presented by the RESEARCHER 
independently. The RESEARCHER is fully responsible for research findings and interpretations.” 
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Structuration theory views action and structure as mutually constitutive (Giddens, 1984; 
Parker, 2000). Structure, in terms of rules and resources, is both constraining and enabling 
action, and human action, by intent or not, is influencing structure, hence the notion of the  
‘duality of structure’ (Giddens, 1976). “Structure is both medium and outcome of the 
reproduction of practices. Structure enters simultaneously into the constitution of the agent 
and social practices, and ‘exists’ in the generating moments of this constitution” (Giddens, 
1979: 5). The process of structuration refers to recursive patterns of structure-action 
interaction in social practices situated in time and space (Giddens, 1984). The theory has a 
distinctive ontological position, both rejecting and integrating subjectivist and objectivist 
views (Stones, 2005). Actors are neither freely choosing their paths of action on a purely 
individual basis, nor is human action determined by social structure. Human beings are 
knowledgeable agents who “know a great deal about the conditions of reproduction of society” 
(Giddens, 1979: 5) and are able to “act otherwise” and “make a difference” (Giddens, 1984: 
14). This corresponds well with the community participants I observe in the case studies. 
Participants are highly knowledgeable within their domains and reflexively monitor their own 
and other’s actions. They take entrepreneurial action, which is enabled and constrained by 
community values, rules, and infrastructures. 
The structuration lens is not directly applied to Papers 1 and 2 and subscribing to structuration 
theory is not a necessary condition for those studies. In Paper 2 on collaborative drug 
discovery, structuration patterns can be observed, particularly in the discussion on 
experimentation and the emergence of governance. Agency theory in its original form is a 
functionalist and positivist theory (Fama, 1980; Jensen and Meckling, 1976); however I build 
on newer and more “social” conceptions of agency (e.g. Lubatkin et al., 2007; Wiseman, 
Cuevas-Rodríguez, and Gomez-Mejia, 2012) which are compatible with the overall 
ontological position of this project.  
Giddensian structuration theory is ontologically oriented and shows a relative neglect of 
epistemology (Stones, 2005). My epistemological position is close to that of critical realism, a 
social theory paradigm compatible with structuration (Bhaskar, 1993; Stones, 2001). Critical 
realism views the world as both objective and subjective reality. Archer (2000) proposes three 
orders of reality, i.e. natural, practical, and social orders, with corresponding forms of 
knowledge; embodied, practical, and discursive knowledge, respectively. Knowledge of the 
outside world will be imperfect and not always possible to attain. Critical realists aim “to 
identify and understand the underlying structures, capacities, mechanisms, etc. which causally 
bear upon (facilitate, influence, produce) surface phenomena” (Lawson, 1997: 233). This is 
consistent with Papers 1 and 2’s focus on governance mechanisms and Paper 3’s focus on 
structure and agency.  
Social systems such as organizations consist of people, and behavioral assumptions are 
essential to studies of such systems. In each of the three research papers I use distinctly 
different, but complementary theoretical lenses in the form of agency theory, cognitive/ 
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problem-solving perspectives, and structuration theory. Taken together, in this study I view 
human beings as knowledgeable (Giddens, 1984), bounded rational actors (March and Simon, 
1958; Simon, 1947), with potentially different interests and information asymmetry among 
them (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Wiseman et al., 2012). This is consistent with March and 
Simon’s (1993: 2) conceptualization of organizations: “Organizations are systems of 
coordinated action among individuals and groups whose preferences, information, interests or 
knowledge differ.” 
Concluding remarks on methods: Increasing the potential for discovery 
In this project, I set out to explore governance in collaborative communities. Initial literature 
studies showed that our understanding of the phenomenon was quite limited and that most 
relevant empirical studies were specific to the domains of natural resource commons and OSS 
communities, where the latter is an important, but special case of the broader phenomenon of 
collaborative communities. I have aimed to study and understand this broader phenomenon. 
This is reflected in the case selection, both the initial broad mapping of communities and the 
selection of the four cases. The extensive (but not exhaustive) mapping provided a broad 
overview of the field and gave me a sense of the most active sectors and common forms. This 
provided a solid basis for the selection of the case set. In that process I tried to balance 
variation and comparability.  
Scientific discovery is a form of complex problem solving (Simon, 1992). Discovery 
processes imply recursive cycles of variation and selection (Ashby, 1960; March, 1991), that 
is, generation of variation in knowledge elements and solution alternatives and effective 
selection between alternatives (Henderson and Stern, 2004; Knudsen and Levinthal, 2007; 
Simon, 1993). Large variation is particularly important in complex, ill-structured, problem 
solving as there is no way of predicting with certainty which elements will constitute the final 
solution. I have deliberately generated within- and across-case variation. First, the four cases 
vary in terms of business sector, the problems they solve, and their geographical footprints; 
nevertheless, as collaborative communities they share key organizational characteristics. 
Second, the volume of data and diversity of data sources and informants per case have 
generated within-case variation. The large volumes of rich, varied, qualitative data within 
relevant contexts for the phenomenon in focus provided a great setting for discovery. 
Scientific discovery also entails extensive search across (all or some of) four spaces, i.e., 
hypothesis, experiment, representation, and strategy spaces (Klahr and Dunbar, 1988; Klahr 
and Simon, 1999; Schunn and Klahr, 1995). In these searches I have combined structured and 
intuitive approaches. First, I have applied multiple theoretical lenses and explored alternative 
explanations (hypothesis space) over multiple iterations in making sense of the data. Second, I 
have collected large amounts of diverse empirical data through a time-consuming and 
elaborate process of field studies, interviews, and desk research (experiment space). The 
interview process illustrates how structure and intuition interact. From a structural perspective 
I based the interviews on a prepared interview guide. The interviews were recorded and 
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transcribed. I did quality assurance on the transcripts, uploaded them to the NVivo analysis 
software, and coded the transcripts. In the process I “experienced” the interview data in three 
different ways: first, in the live interview I interacted with the interviewee, listened to what he 
or she was saying, watched body language, noted the surroundings, smelled the ambient odors 
of the setting (very real in some of the chemistry labs I visited), asked probing questions, and 
improvised. Second, I listened to the recording, read the draft transcript, and wrote my 
corrections. Third, I reread the transcript and applied codes. Both the structured, robust 
process and the different ways of experiencing the data were essential in making sense of 
them and discovering patterns within and across cases. I attempted to capture these data, 
patterns, and findings in textual, tabular, and visual formats (representation space). I reiterated 
these searches countless times throughout the research process. 
Finally, I attempted to validate and assure the quality of my research design, data, and 
findings by obtaining reviews from case contacts, friends, colleagues, and presenting at 
academic conferences. I believe that the process I set up and executed has created significant 
potential for discovery in terms of generating a new understanding of governance and design 
in collaborative communities. The remainder of this dissertation will show if I have been 
successful in both generating and realizing such a potential. 
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Conclusion 
In this concluding chapter I integrate and discuss the findings and implications from the three 
research papers of this dissertation. First, I summarize the findings. Second, I synthesize and 
discuss implications and issues for further research identified in the research papers and point 
towards some promising alleys of research beyond the scope of this study. Third, I discuss 
implications for practice. Finally, I make some concluding remarks. 
Summary of findings 
In Paper 1 I study collaborative community governance through an agency lens and I find that 
agency relationships in collaborative communities are characterized by three distinct multiple 
agency structures: commons, team production, and brokering. These are governed by means 
of four main categories of mechanisms: 1) Mutual monitoring, enabling self-regulation and 
peer-based control; 2) member selection, regulating admission to the community; 3) values 
and rules, guiding member action and collaboration; and 4) property rights and incentives, 
regulating rights to community resources and distribution of rewards. The governance 
mechanisms mitigate the source conditions of agency problems—information asymmetry and 
differential interests—in different ways. I also identify contingencies among governance 
mechanisms and performance. First, the extent of mutual monitoring is inversely related to the 
strictness of member selection, as these are alternative modes of quality control. Second, 
community performance is contingent upon values, rules, incentives, and their enforcement. 
An inadequacy of these increases agency problems and the risk of failure. 
In Paper 2 we investigate governance of large-scale complex problem solving. Based on our 
study of Open Source Drug Discovery (OSDD) we explore an organization design conducive 
to discovery and complex problem solving. Specifically, we identify five mechanisms, which 
together enable governance of large-scale collaborative complex problem solving: 1) 
protocols for searching and broadcasting, which guide exploration and sharing of problems 
and findings; 2) means of identifying and amplifying promising problem solving (or problem 
state) pathways; 3) structured commons that enable effective sharing of heterogeneous 
problem-state representations and problem-solving resources; 4) openness and transparency, 
enabling diversity, self-assignment, and peer-based control; and 5) incentive structures 
supporting concurrent creation of participant and community benefits from exploration. 
Combined, these mechanisms allow for the generation of great variety and broad evaluation. 
The scale of the community provides diversity and capacity, which together enable increased 
search breadth and depth. OSDD takes an experimental approach to designing and calibrating 
its own governance mechanisms. It solves complex problems and is itself a complex system 
where micro-level behavior generates system behavior in a non-simple way. 
In Paper 3 I study the content and process of organization design and the role of deliberate 
design and action in collaborative communities. I trace the structural properties and process 
patterns and advance a structuration perspective of the process of community design, 
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identifying two distinct structure-action patterns: 1) experimentation—testing alternative 
design options in practice and challenging structural constraints through deliberate action; and 
2) institutionalization—the process of community values, rules, and incentives becoming 
increasingly taken for granted over time. Community design, in terms of institutional 
architecture and infrastructure, shapes and is shaped by participant behavior. Such 
structuration processes span across micro-level human behavior and community-level 
structures and practices over time. The communities are characterized by positive externalities 
which play out in two distinct forms: expanded opportunities for collaboration, sharing, and 
exchange from increased participation (i.e. direct network effects) and a self-reinforcing 
gravitational effect from resource commons becoming more attractive to use and contribute to 
as they grow (i.e. resource gravity). The positive externalities are supported by design 
mechanisms such as formalization of rules, transparency, collaboration and knowledge-
sharing infrastructures, and structuring of commons, which enable and enhance connectivity 
and scalability in the communities studied here. The community designs emerging through 
rich structuration processes support self-organization and do not necessarily converge toward 
hierarchy. 
This study has explored how collaborative communities are governed and designed. Papers 1 
and 2 investigate governance challenges arising from agency problems and complex problem 
solving, respectively, and the governance mechanism used to mitigate these challenges. The 
third paper frames organization design as a structuration process where structure and action 
are mutually shaping each other over time and I identify a set of structure-action patterns and 
the mechanism driving them. Taken together the papers cover three major analytical 
dimensions in studying community governance: 1) governance issue; 2) structure and process; 
and 3) level of analysis (see Table 13).  
 
Table 13 Analytical dimensions covered in the research papers 
 Governance issue Structure & process Level of analysis 
 Problem Mechanism Behavior/outcome Structure Process Macro Micro 
Paper 1 X X  X  X  
Paper 2 X X  X X  X 
Paper 3  X X X X X X 
 
Implications and issues for further research 
Across the papers, the communities—despite their differences—are all primarily governed by 
means of institutional mechanisms in terms of values, rules, and incentives that together 
enable large-scale peer-based coordination and control. Rules are specified beyond the 
general level into social and technical protocols for communication, collaboration, and 
problem solving. Rule compliance and quality assurance are predominantly enforced through 
mutual monitoring practices. Extensive networking in operations and governance reinforces 
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community values and rules and accelerates institutionalization processes. Such 
institutionalization yields stable “rules of the game”, but does not generate operational 
rigidities or converge toward hierarchy; rather the contrary, stable institutions enable self-
organization and entrepreneurial action among participants in the communities studied here. 
In the research papers I identify a number of implications and issues for further research. In 
this section I synthesize these implications and issues, as well as outline some new. I discuss 
implications for the domains of organization design, governance and agency theory, 
complexity and bounded rationality, commons and resource-based strategies, and institutions. 
I also outline some possible implications for community leadership and entrepreneurship. 
Organization design 
Any study of governance in organizational settings is also a study of organization design. My 
study contributes to the literature on organization design and has some important implications 
for that field of study. First, the study contributes to our understanding of the content and 
process of organization design. In contrast to conventional hierarchical forms, the locus of 
organizational design is shifted from an authority structure to the principles for organizing, i.e. 
values, rules, and incentives (Fjeldstad et al., 2012; Ostrom, 1990). Communities have strong 
emergent properties as community structure, behavior, and outcomes are generated from self-
organized participant behavior in a non-simple way (Garud, Jain, and Tuertscher, 2008). 
Paper 3 identified structure-action patterns in community design and operations. The content 
and process of design cannot be viewed in isolation as community structure and participant 
action mutually shape each other over time. I found structuration theory (Giddens, 1979, 1984) 
to be a useful lens for studying this interplay and believe that it could be useful for other 
researchers to pursue as well. My study has merely scratched the surface of community design 
processes and we need better understanding of these as well as the contingencies influencing 
structural properties and processual patterns. 
Second, the study highlights the role of technology and infrastructures in community design 
and governance. Infrastructures provide spaces for collaboration and sharing of knowledge 
and other resources among community participants (Fjeldstad et al., 2012; Ostrom and Hess, 
2006). They have both enabling and constraining properties. Information and communication 
technology (ICT) is a key factor enabling distributed collaboration in three of the four cases of 
this study, a finding which resonates well with findings from OSS communities and broader 
societal trends (Castells, 1996; Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Scacchi, 2002; Zammuto et al., 2007). 
OSDD’s innovative and extensive use of ICT enables large-scale distributed collaborative 
problem solving and facilitates the creation, maintenance, and use of structured commons of 
heterogeneous resources. The OSDD case also highlights how core values and rules—
particularly protocols—such as transparency and open peer review are embedded in the 
technological infrastructures (Lessig, 1999; Orlikowski, 1992). Still, ICT is not a necessary 
condition for collaborative communities to emerge and operate. DigiFam is an example of this, 
where shared office facilities were the key infrastructure. My analysis of the community’s 
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demise shows that the relative lack of community ICT infrastructure was not a major 
contributing factor to its failure, rather imbalances in the institutional architecture combined 
with challenging market conditions. The role of physical and virtual infrastructures in 
collaborative communities and other organization forms is a fertile ground for further research. 
Third, collaborative communities are characterized by positive externalities (Bonaccorsi and 
Rossi, 2003; Harhoff, Henkel, and Von Hippel, 2003) in terms of direct network effects and 
the gravitational properties of commons. The positive externalities are supported by design 
mechanisms such as formalization of rules, transparency, collaboration and knowledge-
sharing infrastructures, and structuring of commons, which enable and enhance connectivity 
and scalability. In fact, formalization of rules and scalable infrastructures support large-scale 
self-organization and transparency, rather than bureaucratization as in hierarchical 
organizational forms. The positive externalities appear to contribute to both expanded 
operational opportunities (Gulati, 1999; Harhoff et al., 2003; Uzzi, 1996) and 
institutionalization processes as complying with a set of rules becomes increasingly rewarding 
and the failure to do so increase the probability and consequences of community sanctions 
(North, 1990; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2008). There is a need for more research on how 
organization design enables, enhances, and constrains positive externalities in communities, 
and if these effects and mechanisms are particular to such contexts or applicable to a greater 
variety of organizational forms. 
Governance and agency theory 
Paper 1 documents that agency problems exist in collaborative communities and need to be 
mitigated. They are based on different agency structures than the well-known principal-agent 
structure (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and require a different set of governance 
mechanisms. The study contributes to the multiple-agency literature (e.g. Arthurs et al., 2008; 
Holmstrom, 1982; Varian, 1990) by identifying and elaborating three such structures—
commons, team production, and brokering—and how they interplay. Agency relationships in 
collaborative communities are multiplex, dynamic, and embedded. Community participants 
are both principals and agents. As agents they contribute to fulfill community and other 
participants’ needs and requirements according to shared values and rules. As principals they 
request contributions from other participants, peer-review contributions, and influence the 
direction, practices, and rules of the community. A similar principal-agent duality is observed 
among community participants in organizer roles. They act as principals in shaping rules and 
roles, specifying tasks, and performing monitoring and quality assurance tasks, but are agents 
in brokering roles between other community participants and in stewarding commons and 
infrastructures on behalf of the community. Further exploration of the multiplexity, dynamism, 
and embeddedness of agency relationships in communities, as well as identifying possible 
contingencies for and configurations of community governance mechanisms are promising 
directions for future research. 
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Complexity and bounded rationality 
My findings, and particularly Paper 2 on large-scale complex problem solving in OSDD, 
support the assertion that collaborative community forms are well-suited to address ill-
structured problems (Fjeldstad et al., 2012; Simon, 1973). The ability to dynamically mobilize 
self-organizing constellations of community participants provides collaborative communities 
with sensing and adaptive capabilities, improving the potential to thrive in complex and 
dynamic environments.  
This implies a different way of handling the problem of bounded rationality27 than what is 
commonly found in hierarchies. The hierarchical response to complexity is the successive 
decomposition of complex problems into problems and tasks simple enough for human agents 
to accomplish and the coupling of the task structure with a managerial hierarchy where 
supervising actors govern the activities and resources of subordinate actors across multiple 
levels (Simon, 1962). The task decomposition structure and the corresponding management 
structure are stable and formal (Sabel, 2006). A hierarchical logic is valid under the condition 
of relative stability; when supervisors are capable of decomposing complex tasks into simpler 
ones for subordinate organizational members to execute; the implicit assumption is that 
supervisors are more competent than subordinates in making choices about their work. Under 
conditions of volatility, when no one knows the full answer to a complex problem, and when 
organizational members are frequently more competent in their field of expertise than 
organizers, the decomposition of tasks and the assignment problem have to be dealt with 
differently (Sabel, 2006). Effective complex problem solving requires the creation of shared 
cognitive maps and search heuristics, as no individual actor is capable of independently 
developing sufficiently accurate representations (Fleming and Sorenson, 2004; Gavetti and 
Levinthal, 2000; Walsh and Fahey, 1986), which is an organizational capability documented 
in the study of OSDD.  
Paper 2 shows how OSDD is mitigating several known issues in organizing and governing 
problem solving; including spanning and combining multiple knowledge domains within and 
across organizational boundaries (Hansen, 1999; Jeppesen and Lakhani, 2010; Utterback, 
1974); generating variety and effective evaluation and selection—organizational capabilities 
that are difficult to combine (Henderson and Stern, 2004; Lee et al., 2004; March, 1991; 
Utterback, 1971); and enabling and structuring concurrent and interdependent problem 
solving involving large numbers of participants, teams, and organizations (Kazanjian, Drazin, 
and Glynn, 2000; Thompson, 1967: 158). We highlight how community protocols enable and 
guide participants’ individual and collective problem-solving efforts in a self-organizing 
fashion (Fjeldstad et al., 2012). Our study is based on the case of an ongoing large-scale 
collaborative problem-solving effort, the final outcomes of which we do not know; hence we 
cannot make strong claims for generalizability. There is a need for more comparative research 
on similar organization designs to develop refutable propositions on governance mechanisms, 
                                                 
27 Bounded rationality refers to human behavior as “intendedly rational, but only limited so” (Simon, 1976: 
xxviii). 
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contingencies, performance, and boundary conditions for community-based complex problem 
solving. 
Commons and resource-based strategies 
In line with previous studies on collaborative community organizational forms (e.g. Benkler, 
2002; Fjeldstad et al., 2012), I find commons to be an important element of such designs. 
However, the size and importance varies across my four cases; from DigiFam where common 
resources were scarce to OSDD where the commons are very elaborate and central to its 
design and operations. OSDD’s commons comprise a heterogeneous set of physical and 
intangible resources. They are structured in ways that enable effective sharing of 
heterogeneous problem-state representations and problem-solving resources by means of rules 
and infrastructures that set submission, storage, and retrieval standards and procedures. These 
structures facilitate quality assurance, resource use and combination, and become increasingly 
important with growing resource scale and heterogeneity. Findings on commons structure and 
resource heterogeneity complement the literature on commons in general (Ostrom, 1990, 
2009), and knowledge commons in particular (Lee and Cole, 2003; Ostrom and Hess, 2006). 
The literature on commons of natural resources suggests that small, homogenous communities 
are more likely to be able to sustain a commons (Cardenas, 2003; Ostrom et al., 2002). The 
OSDD case suggests that a large and diverse community is conducive to building growing 
and sustainable knowledge commons and problem-solving capabilities, which is consistent 
with findings from OSS communities (Benkler, 2002). 
The study has implications for the organization of knowledge resources and resource-based 
strategies. It contributes to our understanding of the organization of knowledge resources, the 
lesser studied element of Barney’s VRIO (Value, Rareness, Imitability, Organization) 
framework (Barney, 1995, 1996). Knowledge resides in the knowledge commons and in 
knowledgeable participants. The organization shapes how knowledge resources are 
accumulated, maintained, retrieved, and combined; hence it enables and constrains knowledge 
use and the value creation from it. The cumulative and evolutionary nature of commons 
matches classical accounts of the resource-based view (e.g. Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Penrose, 
1959). However, the openness and transparency of crucial resources in commons stand in 
contrast to the focus on non-imitability and appropriability of firm-controlled resources 
through e.g. property rights protection in central resource-based works (Barney, 1991; 
Wernerfelt, 1984). Commons increase in value by being widely available as they attract new 
contributions (Benkler, 2002); hence non-imitability is achieved by superior resource gravity 
and network effects rather than secrecy. There is a need for more research on the sources and 
growth trajectories of resource-based organizational advantages and deeper understanding of 
governance in communities as critical resources and interdependencies span organizational 
boundaries. 
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Institutions 
The findings across the three research papers of this dissertation highlight the importance of 
organization-level institutional mechanisms in enabling and regulating community 
participation and contribution. Formalized rules and protocols guiding collaboration and 
sharing coupled with transparency make communities less dependent on social cohesion as 
the basis for trust. This provides the foundation for scalable designs that enhance self-
organization and adaptiveness. Hence, governance of collaborative communities is practiced 
primarily through institutional mechanisms, in contrast to authority-based mechanisms in 
hierarchical organizational forms (Fjeldstad et al., 2012: 746). These organization-level 
mechanisms are analogous to macro-level institutions governing markets and resource 
commons (North, 1990; North and Wallis, 1994; Ostrom, 1990). Institutional architecture can 
be viewed as an organization-level equivalent of the field-level construct of institutional logic, 
referring to the constellation of beliefs and associated practices (the schemas and scripts) that 
the actors in a field hold in common (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Lounsbury, 2007; Owen-
Smith and Powell, 2008: 602). 
Institutional architectures have to be adapted to the context they are used (Hess and Ostrom, 
2003; Ostrom, 2009; Ostrom and Hess, 2006). Papers 2 and 3 highlight the emergence of 
governance and the process of design in the communities. The process influences the design 
outcome and the effectiveness of the design. Rules, unlike physical constraints, have to be 
understood and deemed legitimate by participants to be effective (Ostrom, 2000: 152). Case 
findings suggest that the strong presence of network effects in communities accelerates the 
pace of institutionalization processes (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2008), and either enhances 
the effectiveness of institutional governance mechanisms (North, 1990) or lock-in to 
inefficient solutions (Arthur, 1994) depending on the congruence among mechanisms and 
their appropriateness for the context. Studying the formation of institutions as structuration 
processes (Barley and Tolbert, 1997) provided me with a good vantage point to capture both 
institutionalization pressures and human agency yielding path dependent (Arthur, 1994; 
Sydow, Schreyögg, and Koch, 2009) and path creation patterns (Garud and Karnøe, 2001; 
Garud, Kumaraswamy, and Karnøe, 2010), respectively. I believe my study has contributed 
new insights to this area, but we certainly need deeper understanding of institutions-based 
governance in collaborative organizational forms and the conditions and practices shaping the 
design and emergence of institutional mechanisms. 
Implications beyond the scope of this study 
In addition to the findings and implications discussed in the research papers, the data and 
investigations of my study points to possible implications and promising alleys for future 
research beyond the scope of the research papers of this dissertation. I would like to highlight 
two such areas: leadership and entrepreneurship in collaborative community contexts. First, 
the lesser importance of formal authority (despite its existence) compared to hierarchical 
organizational forms accentuates the significance of other bases of leadership and governance. 
Leadership is vital in the operation of governance (McAlister and Ferrell, 2005), so also in the 
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collaborative communities investigated in this study, but with different characteristics than in 
conventional hierarchical designs. Preliminary observations indicate that community 
leadership is based on the 1) shaping and maintenance of institutional architectures and 
infrastructures; 2) stewardship of community commons; 3) mediation of contact and resources 
among participants; and 4) mobilization of attention and resources towards strategic priorities. 
Furthermore, leadership processes are also an interesting area of study. Findings indicate that 
selecting leaders by appointment could be ineffective or even counterproductive in some 
settings. The emergence of leadership seems to be rather organic as leading participants take 
responsibility, show initiative, excel in operational and managerial tasks, and gain legitimacy 
from peers. Collaborative communities are interesting contexts for studying leadership that is 
not based on hierarchical authority. Studies in this area could contribute to our understanding 
of collaborative leadership practices in communities and possibly also in other organization 
forms. 
Second, I have followed the development of all four cases before, during, and after their 
founding through retrospective questions in interviews with founders and early members and 
through documents from the same periods. These reveal fascinating stories of 
entrepreneurship, big ideas, and experimentation. All four lead founders are visionary and 
charismatic people with large professional networks and the willingness and ability to 
mobilize these networks. Still, they appear to differ in their ability to attract and empower 
community organizers with complementary capabilities and ability to develop and steward 
sustainable institutional architectures and infrastructures. This is a fertile ground for research 
on entrepreneurship improving our understanding of the processes, capabilities, and 
contingencies of community entrepreneurship, as well as enriching the broader 
entrepreneurship literature. 
Implications for practice 
The study has implications for managerial practice in terms of organizing learning and 
problem solving, designing institutional architectures, and conducting strategy and design 
processes. First, the four communities organize discovery and problem solving largely in a 
self-organizing fashion based on shared values and rules with extensive experimentation and 
rapid feedback cycles. This represents a novel approach to enable and enhance organizational 
and individual learning. Experimental learning is effective under conditions of complexity, 
uncertainty, and dynamism as accurate forecasting and long-term planning is inept in such 
settings (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997). Such approaches appear to be very useful as 
predicting the outcomes of particular initiatives in communities are very difficult given 
factors such as participant autonomy and positive externalities. Furthermore, an increasing 
number of organizations, such as consulting companies and research labs, have complex 
problem solving as their primary mode of operation. Such organizations have other strategic 
and organizational characteristics and challenges than the archetypical industrial 
manufacturing firms that so much of management theory and practice is derived from (Stabell 
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and Fjeldstad, 1998; Thompson, 1967). Paper 2 on collaborative problem solving identifies 
mechanisms for governing non-hierarchical distributed problem solving that may be 
applicable for organizing collaborative efforts in problem-solving organizations. 
Second, the fundamental values and constitutive rules have to be formulated with care in early 
stages of a community’s development due to the potentially rapid institutionalization of these 
elements. The institutional architecture has to provide a basis for motivating participation and 
create a sustainable balance between contributions and benefits. This is imperative for 
community entrepreneurs and early stage community organizers to pay attention to. There are, 
however, no universal recipes for how to design the institutional architecture as it has to 
match the community purpose, the nature of problems and tasks, the participant 
characteristics, and the cultural and institutional context. 
Third, strategizing and designing are ongoing processes intermeshed with operational work, 
rather than occasional analysis and design activities secluded from operations and operational 
participants. In principle, anybody can be a designer and a strategist in collaborative 
communities, as any member can make contributions with strategic and organization design 
implications. Still, the leadership roles of community organizers are important. In organizing 
autonomous and knowledgeable participants community organizers are challenged to lead by 
mobilizing community members to contribute, connecting complementary people and 
resources, and facilitating strategy and design processes. 
Concluding remarks 
The growing number and importance of collaborative communities (Heckscher and Adler, 
2006; Snow et al., 2011), and more generally the move from hierarchical to more 
collaborative organization forms (Child and McGrath, 2001; Daft and Lewin, 1993; Fjeldstad 
et al., 2012; Lewin and Volberda, 1999), is creating new opportunities and challenges. 
Opportunities include enabling and enhancing knowledge creation and combination, problem 
solving, innovation, and commercialization (Adler, Kwon, and Heckscher, 2008; Lee and 
Cole, 2003; Snow et al., 2011), but communities also have to deal with challenging 
governance issues. In this dissertation I highlight governance issues stemming from agency 
problems and complexity—specifically complex problem solving—such as challenges related 
to multiple actors sharing valuable resources in commons, collaboration in teams, facilitation 
of contact and exchange between actors, establishing and sharing shared representations of 
complex problems, and mobilizing and coordinating autonomous actors towards shared ends.  
The communities of this study are primarily governed by means of institutional mechanisms 
in terms of values, rules (protocols in particular), and incentives that together enable large-
scale peer-based coordination and control. Their organizational designs and design processes 
are characterized by the positive externalities inherent in their networks of participants and 
resource commons. These externalities are accommodated by design mechanisms involving 
formalization, technical infrastructures, and resource structures that together enable 
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community scalability and connectivity, without imposing hierarchical rigidities. Design 
processes play out in structuration patterns as community structures and participant behavior 
mutually shape each other over time.  
Community designs are highly adaptive and conducive to collaborative exploration, problem 
solving, and service delivery—organizational capabilities in high demand in today’s complex 
and rapidly changing environment. Such organizational forms challenge established notions 
of organizational structures, strategy and design processes, and leadership skills and practices 
rooted in the hierarchies of the industrial era. My hope is that this study will trigger new 
questions, inspire further research, and inform practice in the field of community governance, 
organizing, and strategy. 
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